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Rehabilitating the Medical Board's 
Diversion Program 
by Julianne D' Angelo Fellmeth 
What if your doctor were an alcoholic? A drug ad­dict? What if he stole narcotics from his hospital's supply, self-injected while on duty, and practiced 
medicine while under the influence?1 Can you think of any­
one more dangerous to wield a scalpel, administer anesthe­
sia, or suture your child? 
Addiction to alcohol or drugs is a chronic, lifelong dis­
ease in which relapse and recidivism are expected.2 Called 
"an occupational hazard" for health care professionals by one 
of the nation's leading experts, 3 addiction among physicians 
�-- · ··- -·-·--·-··-----' 
medical licenses) into an in-house, Board-sponsored moni­
toring program subsidized with $800,000 annually in licens­
ing fees paid by all California physicians. Participation in the 
Diversion Program is absolutely confidential; "successful" 
participants are immunized from disciplinary action for self­
abuse of drugs or alcohol; and many physicians enter and 
complete the Program without any interruption whatsoever 
in their medical practice. 
Supporters argue that the Di version Program protects the 
public by identifying impaired physicians, providing them 
is a serious and growing problem. 
Physicians may be particularly 
susceptible to substance abuse 
problems due to the stresses of 
working in a health care environ­
ment, enhanced access to con­
trolled substances, and an income 
level that permits them to pur­
chase drugs if necessary. Al-
Called "an occupational hazard.. for 
health care professionals by one of the 
nation's leading experts.addiction among 
physicians is a serious and growing 
with access to appropriate inter­
vention programs and treatment 
services, and monitoring them for 
several years to ensure they have 
recovered and are consistently ca­
pable of safe practice. According 
to Dr. Gene Feldman, who was 
president of the Medical Board 
problem.· 
though the existence of this problem is not disputed, its reach 
and scope are the subject of some debate: 
• "The AMA conservatively estimates that one of every ten 
practicing physicians in this country becomes seriously 
impaired."4 
• "The incidence of impaired physicians is much higher than 
we had originally perceived. It is apparent now that four­
teen to fifteen percent of physicians at some point in his 
or her career will become impaired. Of these impaired 
physicians only six to eight percent have primary psychi­
atric disease."5 
during 1980 when the Program 
was created, "the Diversion Program was enacted because a 
lot of doctors who came before us in discipline had hurt no 
one but themselves through the disease of substance abuse/ 
chemical dependency. They were being disciplined at an av­
erage cost of $30,000 per case, and most had already gone 
into rehabilitation programs and were clean and sober. But 
we were required to discipline them and ruin their lives. "7 Dr. 
Feldman and others envisioned the Program as being cheaper 
than discipline and more protective of consumers, in that it 
could immediately remove an impaired physician from prac­
tice if necessary (whereas the discipline system at that time 
lacked any meaningful interim remedies). • "In 1964, Modlin and Montes noted that estimates of the 
incidence of narcotic addiction in physicians varied from 
30 to 100 times that found in the 
Has that vision been realized? Over the past five years, 
the Center for Public Interest Law (CPIL) has expressed 
repeated concerns about the 
- ··-- --·-- --. ------ --- - -- ----· -"-- , structure, functioning, and general population, and they classi­
fied such addiction as an occupa­
tional hazard."6 
Over the past five years, the Center for operations of the Medical 
What if the Medical Board-the 
state agency charged with consumer 
protection as its highest priority-knew 
about such physicians, refused to tell 
consumers, and let those physicians 
PubliclnterestLaw(CPIL)hasexpressed Board's Diversion Pro-
. repeated con()erns about the stru_cture\ "' gram. 8 CPIL has registered 
f'llnction.ing!aqdoperaticms ofthet,ledic� several levels of concern 
Board's Diversion Prog':'ffl� ; l about the Program, ranging 
__ _____ -- ----··•·· __ ___ ___ ___ ____ __ , , ___ J from the philosophical to 
continue to practice medicine while attempting rehabilitation 
and recovery? 
the structural to the opera­
tional. In 1998, the Board's Division of Medical Quality 
finally created a task force to investigate CPIL's claims. To 
assist that task force, the Medical Board, and the California 
Legislature in reforming this program which is of critical 
importance to patient protection, we present the following 
facts and criticisms. 
Meet the Diversion Program of the Medical Board of 
California. This legislatively-created program "diverts" phy­
sicians who are abusing or addicted to drugs or alcohol from 
the disciplinary track (which might revoke or suspend their 
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Diversion Program 
Purpose and Structure 
The Medical Board of California (MBC) is the state agency 
charged with regulating physicians.9 MBC licenses physicians, 10 
establishes standards for the practice of medicine in Califor­
nia, 11 and enforces those standards through its enforcement 
program.12 By statute, MBC consists of twelve physicians and 
seven non-physicians. 13 Seventeen of the Board's nineteen 
members (including all of the physician members) are appointed 
by the Governor; one public member is appointed by the Sen­
ate Rules Committee, and the remaining public member is ap­
pointed by the Assembly Speaker.14 MBC is divided into two 
autonomous divisions: the Division of Licensing (DOL) and 
the Division of Medical Quality (DMQ). 15 
DMQ is responsible for overseeing the Board's enforce­
ment program, which receives and investigates complaints 
against licensed physicians, 16 and directs the Health Quality 
Enforcement Section within the Attorney General's Office17 
to file formal charges and prosecute disciplinary cases against 
physicians at evidentiary hearings presided over by adminis­
trative law judges of the Office of Administrative Hearings.18 
Following the hearing, DMQ members review proposed de­
cisions written by ALJs and make final disciplinary deci­
sions.19 DMQ also adopts regulations and establishes policy 
governing MBC's enforcement program.20 
DMQ is also charged with establishing criteria for and 
overseeing the operation of the Board's Diversion Program.21 
The Legislature created the Diversion Program in 1980 and 
charged it with "identifying and rehabilitating physi­
cians . . .  with impairment due to abuse of dangerous drugs or 
alcohol.. .affecting competency so that physicians ... so afflicted 
may be treated and returned to the practice of medicine in a 
manner which will not endanger the public health and 
safety."22 The Legislature further specified its intent about the 
priorities of the Diversion Program in 1990, when it enacted 
Business and Professions Code section 2229; that provision 
states that "[p ]rotection of the public shall be the highest pri­
ority for the Division of Medical Quality . . . .  Where rehabilita­
tion and protection are inconsistent, protection shall be para­
mount. "23 
How does the Diversion Program work? Physicians who 
abuse drugs or alcohol may voluntarily "self-refer" into the 
Diversion Program, in which case their participation remains 
confidential from the Board's Enforcement Program and the 
public .24 Alternatively, DMQ may require a physician to par­
ticipate in the Diversion Program as a condition of probation 
or in settlement of a disciplinary proceeding.25 The Program 
enters into an individualized contract with each participant. 
The contract may require the participant to temporarily cease 
the practice of medicine; it also specifies numerous terms and 
conditions of participation, including requirements for ran­
dom bodily fluid testing, mandatory group meeting atten­
dance, physical, psychiatric, psychological, and competency 
testing, and worksite monitors if the participant is permit­
ted to practice medicine. The goal of the various Diversion 
Program "players"-all of whom are described below-is to 
ensure compliance with the terms of the contract. 
Those who "successfully complete the Program"26 are 
immune from disciplinary action for self-abuse of drugs or 
alcohol, which otherwise is unprofessional conduct and 
grounds for discipline by the Board.27 Noncompliance with 
the terms of a Diversion Program contract is grounds for ter­
mination from the Program, and risks exposure to disciplin­
ary action for self-abuse of drugs and alcohol under Business 
and Professions Code section 2239.28 
The "Players" 
Division of Medical Quality 
Unlike diversion programs for substance-abusing licens­
ees at other California occupational licensing agencies, the 
Legislature structured the Medical Board's program to be 
operated and administered internally. With regard to the Di­
version Program, DMQ is expressly charged with the follow­
ing duties: 
• ensuring that protection of the public is the Program's 
highest priority ("where rehabilitation and protection are 
inconsistent, protection shall be paramount");29 
• establishing regional Diversion Evaluation Committees 
(see below) and appointing their members;30 
• establishing criteria for "the acceptance, denial, or termina­
tion of physicians" from the Diversion Program;31 
• establishing criteria for the selection of "administrative 
physicians" who examine physicians requesting admis­
sion into the Diversion Program;32 
• requiring each Diversion Evaluation Committee to sub­
mit a biannual report including information concerning 
the number of cases accepted, denied, or terminated with 
compliance or noncompliance, and a cost analysis of the 
program";33 and 
• "administering the provisions" of the statutes creating the 
Diversion Program.34 
Thus, the Division of Medical Quality retains policy­
making authority over the Diversion Program. However, it 
has no role in decisionmaking as to individual participants 
or the terms of their Diversion Program contracts. 35 This im­
portant function of the Diversion Program is carried out by 
local-level Diversion Evaluation Committees. 
Diversion Evaluation Committees 
The Diversion Evaluation Committees (DECs) are re­
gional committees created in statute.36 Currently, a total of 
five DECs operate in California; two convene in the Berke­
ley area, and three in Los Angeles. DEC members are ap­
pointed by DMQ. DECs must consist of three licensed physi­
cians and two non-physicians;37 all DEC members must have 
"experience or knowledge in the evaluation or management 
of persons who are impaired due to alcohol or drug abuse . . . .  "38 
DECs meet quarterly, and are charged by statute with the fol­
lowing activities: 
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• evaluating physicians who request participation in the 
Diversion Program; 
• reviewing and designating treatment facilities to which Di­
version Program participants may be referred; 
• receiving and reviewing information concerning physi­
cians participating in the Diversion Program; 
• considering whether a participant "may with safety con­
tinue or resume the practice of medicine"; 
• setting forth a written treatment program for each par­
ticipant, including requirements for group meeting atten­
dance and other "supervision and surveillance"; 
• holding "a general meeting at least twice a year, which 
shall be open and public," to evaluate the Program's 
progress, review data required to be included in reports to 
DMQ, prepare reports to be submitted to DMQ, and sug­
gest proposals for changes in the Program;39 and 
• submitting to DMQ a biannual report which includes "in­
formation concerning the number of cases accepted, de­
nied, or terminated with compliance or noncompliance, and 
a cost analysis of the program."40 
The DECs' decisionmaking about individual Diversion 
Program participants is informed and assisted by Diversion 
Program staff on several levels: ( 1 )  local group facilitators 
who conduct group meetings with Program participants; (2) 
regional case managers who monitor each participant's com­
pliance with the terms of his/her contract; and (3) Sacramento­
based Program management staff. 
Group Facilitators 
All Diversion Program contracts include required atten­
dance at local meetings conducted by Diversion Program 
group facilitators. Group facilitators are independent contrac­
tors to the Medical Board, not Board employees. Every week 
across the state,41 fourteen ( 14) group facilitators hold meet­
ings of six to twelve participants. Depending on their con­
tract terms, participants may be required to attend one or two 
group meetings per week. According to the Diversion 
Program's policy and procedure manual, group facilitators 
are expected to provide "recovery-oriented psychotherapy 
which focuses on the use of 1 2-step programs."42 Group fa­
cilitators are paid directly by participants at the rate of $235 
per month for two meetings per week, or $ 165 for one meet­
ing per week. The facilitators are responsible for convening 
and facilitating group meetings, recording attendance, observ­
ing participants for signs of substance abuse, ensuring the 
collection of urine samples for testing, and reporting atten­
dance and suspected compliance problems to regional Diver­
sion Program case managers.43 
Case Managers 
Currently, the Program employs five case managers, each 
of whom monitors case files on a caseload of 50-60 Diver­
sion Program participants in a specified geographical area; 
case managers are currently based in Sacramento, the Bay 
Area, San Bernardino, Glendale, and Orange County. The case 
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managers receive and review urine test results and reports 
from group facilitators, hospital well-being committees, and 
worksite monitors, and ensure that all participants in their 
caseloads are complying with the terms of their Diversion 
Program contracts. According to the Diversion Program's 
policy and procedure manual, case managers are also required 
to personally interview applicants for admission into the Di­
version Program in their assigned geographical area; attend 
group meetings in their geographical area at least once every 
two months in order to personally  observe Program partici­
pants and the group facilitators' performance; and attend DEC 
meetings when a participant in their caseload appears before 
the Committee.44 
Program Manager 
The Sacramento-based Diversion Program Manager is a 
full-time civil service employee of the Medical Board respon­
sible for the overall administration of the Diversion Program. 
The Program Manager directly supervises compliance activi­
ties, data collection, and the activities of all Diversion Pro­
gram case managers and group facilitators. 
Liaison Committee to the Diversion Program 
In addition to all the various "players" described above, 
the Medical Board has added another layer of input not au­
thorized by statute. Shortly after enactment of the law creat­
ing the Diversion Program, DMQ and the California Medical 
Association (CMA) established the "Liaison Committee to 
the Diversion Program." The Liaison Committee is an advi­
sory body charged with serving as (a) "an information shar­
ing and clarification body regarding Diversion Program poli­
cies and procedures; (b) a forum for consideration of infor­
mation from outside the Program; and (c) a forum for discus­
sion of long-range Program plans."45 
The Liaison Committee membership includes the chair 
of each regional Diversion Evaluation Committee; represen­
tatives of Diversion Program and MBC executive staff, the 
California Medical Association (CMA), and the California 
Society of Addiction Medicine (CSAM); and two members 
of DMQ.46 The Liaison Committee meets quarterly in pri­
vate. During the public session of each quarterly DMQ meet­
ing, the Diversion Program Manager reports recent signifi­
cant Liaison Committee actions and recommendations to the 
Division of Medical Quality. Generally, Diversion Program 
staff simply implement decisions and recommendations of 
the Liaison Committee; it is rare for DMQ to review or ratify 
a recommendation of the Liaison Committee.47 
Major Diversion Program Issues 
As noted above, CPIL is concerned about the Diversion 
Program on many levels. At the most basic level, DMQ and 
the Diversion Program have wholly failed to comply with sev­
eral statutory requirements for the past 18  years. For example: 
• Since 1980, Business and Professions Code section 
2350(h) has required DMQ to establish criteria for the se­
lection of "administrative physicians"-physicians who 
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are assigned to perform medical and psychiatric exami­
nations of prospective Diversion Program participants.48 
DMQ has never adopted those criteria, and has devel­
oped no training materials to adequately convey Diver­
ability. DMQ is not authorized to delegate its policymaking 
role to private parties, especially in the absence of statutory 
authorization. Yet it has undeniably done just that-Diver­
sion Program staff interpret Liaison Committee directives and 
sion Program policies, priori­
ties, and procedures to new ad­
ministrative physicians. 
• Since 1980, Business and Pro­
fessions Code section 2350(i) 
has required the DECs to sub­
mit biannual reports to DMQ 
No DEC has ��bmitted a report u�d�-1 
section 2350(1) for at least the past five 
years. Neither Diversion Program staff nor 
recommendations as orders, and 
implement them without review or 
ratification by DMQ.50 
Due to DMQ's lack of inter­
est, the Diversion Program lacks 
an overall guiding philosophy DMQ has ever required one. 
detailing the number of cases accepted, denied, or termi­
nated with compliance or noncompliance, and analyzing 
the cost of the program. No DEC has submitted a report 
under section 2350(i) for at least the past five years. Nei­
ther Diversion Program staff 
which demonstrably protects con­
sumers from the Medical Board's most dangerous licensees, 
as required by Business and Professions Code section 2229. 
It Jacks protocols and standards to guide the decisions and 
actions of the DECs, the Program Manager, the case manag-
ers, and the group facilitators. The 
nor DMQ has ever required 
one. 
• Since 1980, Business and Pro­
fessions Code section 2352(g) 
has required each DEC to hold 
a public meeting twice a year. 
CPIL has been on the Medical 
Due to DMQ's lack of interest, the Diversion 
Program lacks an overall guiding philosophy 
which demonstrably protects consumers from 
the Medical Board's most dangerous licensees, 
as required by Business and Professions Code 
section 2229. 
Program's enabling act is outdated 
and vague; its implementing regu­
lations, adopted by DMQ in 198 1 ,  
are minimal and merely nonsub­
stantive restatements of the stat­
ute; its policy and procedure 
manual is not law, and DMQ has 
Board's mailing list for 1 8  
years; not once has any DEC ever published notice of 
such a meeting. Neither Diversion Program staff nor DMQ 
has ever required the DECs to comply with this require-
ment. 
These requirements are statutory, and the Medical Board 
should either comply with them or sponsor legislation to 
change the statutes. However, even full compliance with these 
statutes would fail to address the four major flaws of the 
Diversion Program, which are briefly summarized as follows. 
DMQ's Failure to Properly Oversee the 
Diversion Program 
established no mechanisms to de-
termine or measure compliance with it. No member of DMQ 
is familiar with the operations of the Program. DMQ has al­
lowed the Program to flounder-unsupervised and standard­
less-for 19 years. 
This criticism is not new, and CPIL is not the first to level 
it. Three audits during the 1980s all found that the Diversion 
Program fails to adequately monitor drug- and alcohol-depen­
dent physicians-the raison d 'etre of the Program.51 As far 
back as 1982, the state Auditor General found serious defi­
ciencies with the Diversion Program, and opined that they 
stem "from the lack of established standards and guidelines 
for terminating participants" and that, "in particular, [the 
Medical Board] has not clarified the requirement that a physi-
Business and Professions Code section 2346 unambigu- cian be terminated from the program when that physician is 
ously delegates DMQ with the responsibility for overseeing deemed too great a risk to public health . . . .  [Consequently,] there 
the Diversion Program, for establishing its guiding philoso- is no assurance that the public is being adequately protected 
phy, goals, and protocols, and for adopting regulations and during the process of rehabilitating physicians."52 In 1985, the 
administrative policies to guide its day-to-day activities. How- Auditor General repeated this criticism, and described an as-
ever, DMQ has never taken own- .-- -------�- _ _ _____ _ .. . tounding example of this critical ership of this program. Instead, it failure: "On four separate occa-
created the Liaison Committee in Three audits during the I fSOs all found that sions over a three-month period, 
1982 and has-for all intents and the Diversion Program fails to adequately urine samples collected from the 
purposes-abdicated its policy- monitor drug- aRd al cohol-dependent participant during his office hours 
Physicians-the raison d' e_· tre of the Program. making role and administrative revealed that he was under the in-
authority over the Program to that ' ---- -· ----- ---·· ------ - ...., fluence of alcohol."53 Yet the Pro-
Committee. DMQ's "oversight" of the Diversion Program gram Manager failed to suspend the physician from practic-
consists of its receipt and review of a two-page statistical ing medicine, and failed to terminate the physician from Pro-
report submitted by Program staff at each quarterly DMQ gram participation.54 
meeting, and its routine approval of staff and Liaison Com- To this day, DMQ has taken no meaningful actions to 
mittee nominations for DEC vacancies.49 establish such standards or otherwise clarify its philosophy 
As noted above, the Liaison Committee is composed about the Diversion Program. It has failed to establish or even 
largely of private citizens; it meets infrequently and in pri- discuss criteria which justify termination from the Program, 
vate, insulated from public scrutiny, comment, and account- any policy whatsoever for the Program's approach toward 
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physicians who relapse into drug or alcohol use, or criteria 
for required practice cessation. It has failed to address any of 
the serious operational flaws which have been brought to its 
attention over the past decade (see below). 
The Division must discontinue its delegation of the over­
sight of the Diversion Program to the Liaison Committee; 
that committee is neither authorized to nor capable of engag­
ing in such oversight. DMQ must reestablish itself as admin­
istrator of the Diversion Program, clearly communicate that 
role to Diversion Program staff, and redefine the role of the 
Liaison Committee. 
Fragmented Nature of Program Decisionmaking 
F E ATURE ARTI CLE 
simply follow the DECs' orders, made without the benefit of 
any clear guidelines or regulations established by DMQ. 
And because the operations of the Diversion Program 
are shrouded in secrecy, no one is able to adequately monitor 
its effectiveness. We are left to rely on "spin" articles written 
by staff and Liaison Committee members,55 incomplete sta­
tistical data,56 and a misleading "success rate" constantly trum­
peted by the Program.57 
DMQ must gain control of the Diversion Program. It, or 
an active subset of it (such as a Standing Committee on the 
Diversion Program), must engage in major policy and proce­
dural decisionmaking and establish monitoring mechanisms 
to gauge staff's adherence to those policies and procedures. 
As described above, Diversion Program decisionmak- DMQ also must seek legislative repeal of the statutes which 
ing-both as to policy and indi- ---- ----- ----· ___ ···--· _ ___ permit the DECs to determine the 
vidual participants-is subject to These locaJ committees--composed of terms and conditions of Diversion 
input from a variety of levels: private parties--are shooting from the Program contracts and to make 
DMQ, the Liaison Committee, the hip in an attempt to deaJ with the state's '. standardless, unsupervised deci-
DECs, group facilitators, and Di- ·. most dangerous physicians. ___ 
· sions about individual Program 
version Program staff. Each of participants. 
these levels suffers from major flaws. Although DMQ has been 
delegated the major policymaking role, it has withdrawn and 
effectively redelegated that function to the Liaison Commit­
tee, whose role is nonstatutory and uncertain. 
As to the contents of individual participants' contracts 
and decisionmaking regarding their compliance with those 
contracts, the statute delegates major responsibility to the 
DECs. This is an unfortunate selection. These committees­
composed of private citizens-meet on the local level, infre­
quently, and in private. Although they are composed of indi­
viduals knowledgeable of chemical dependency, their deci­
sions are made in a vacuum. Because DMQ has failed to adopt 
any standards to guide DEC decisionmaking, inconsistency 
is almost assured. Because DEC decisions are not reported or 
recorded in any way, no DEC has 
The Program Permits Private Parties to Exercise 
State Police Power 
Perhaps the most serious structural problem of the Di­
version Program lies in the fact that its enabling act delegates 
state police power decisionmaking authority to private par­
ties. As will be discussed below, this statute is void as uncon­
stitutional and as inconsistent with federal antitrust law. 
As noted above, Business and Professions Code section 
2352 authorizes the DECs to engage in several activities, most 
of which are advisory or recommendatory. However, section 
2352(e) authorizes the DECs to "consider in the case of each 
physician .. . participating in the program whether he or she may 
with safety continue or resume the practice of medicine," and 
section 2352(f) authorizes the 
any idea how another DEC has 
acted in a similar case. Because 
neither DMQ nor Program staff 
review or ratify DEC decisions, 
the Program lacks a structural 
check on inconsistent or errone­
I PerHaps the most serious structuraJ problem I 
I of the Diversion Program lies in the fact that ! 
I ijs e,aabling act delegates state police. power i 
· decisionmaking authority to private parties. 
DECs to "set forth in writing . . .  a 
treabnent program established for 
each physician . . .  with the require­
ments for supervision and surveil­
lance." These provisions have 
ous decisions. And because the DECs have failed to comply 
with Business and Professions Code section 2350(i) by sub­
mitting biannual statistical reports, neither Program staff nor 
DMQ is able to comprehensively monitor the actions of the 
Program. These local committees--composed of private par­
ties-are shooting from the hip in an attempt to deal with the 
state's most dangerous physicians. Neither DMQ nor the Di­
version Program can assure patients and consumers that the 
Program's decisionmaking as to these physicians is swift, ef­
fective, and consistent, as expressly required by Business and 
Professions Code sections 2229 and 2340. 
The staff of the Program-the Program Manager and the 
five case managers located all over the state-receive and 
transmit information from the group facilitators, the DECs, 
and the Liaison Committee. But staff make no decisions. 
According to staff, decisions are made by the DECs; staff 
been interpreted by the Diversion 
Program to confer absolute, autonomous, and unreviewable 
decisionmaking authority on the DECs as to the terms and 
conditions of each participant's contract, including whether 
the physician is permitted to practice medicine.58 The DECs 
also decide the point at which a participant has either "gradu­
ated"59 or should be "terminated unsuccessfully" from the Pro­
gram.60 No member of the Medical Board or its staff reviews 
or ratifies the DECs' decisionmaking. 
A determination of the terms and conditions of an occu-
pational license is clearly the exercise of state police power 
authority-which exercise is reserved to government officials, 
not private parties. As such, subsections 2352(e) and (f) vio­
late two key legal doctrines: ( 1 )  They improperly delegate 
state police power decisionmaking authority to private par­
ties-a violation of the constitutional principle of separation 
of powers; and (2) they violate federal antitrust law in that 
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they pennit private parties to collude and restrict the access 
of a competitor to the marketplace (a "conspiracy to restrain 
trade" or "group boycott" in antitrust parlance), without ad­
equate state supervision as required by the "state action" ex­
ception to antitrust scrutiny. 
• Unlawful Delegation to Private Parties. The "unlaw­
ful delegation" argument is based upon one of the most fun­
damental tenets of our governmental structure-the separa­
tion of powers between the three branches of government. 
"The doctrine of separation of powers under our form of gov­
ernment, which is expressly stated in the constitution, declares 
that governmental powers are divided among the three de­
partments of government, the legislative, executive, and ju­
dicial, and that persons charged with the exercise of one power 
may not exercise either of the others except as permitted by 
the constitution."61 
Explicit in the structure of our government is the notion 
that one branch may not perform the powers of another branch, 
and may not delegate its governmental powers to another 
branch. Implicit in this structure, and a fortiori, is the notion 
that all governmental power must be exercised by government 
officials, and may not be delegated to non-governmental pri­
vate parties. Fundamental governmental police powers must 
be exercised by government officials, not by private parties.62 
The DECs are composed of private parties. DEC mem­
bers are not appointed by the Governor or other elected offi­
cials. They are appointed by DMQ, upon nomination by the 
Liaison Committee (also composed almost entirely of pri­
vate parties). No statute or regulation requires them to take 
an oath, file conflict-of-interest statements with the Fair Po­
litical Practices Commission, or become aware of circum­
stances under which they must recuse themselves from state 
decisionmaking. DEC members unilaterally determine the 
terms and conditions under which a state licensee may exer­
cise that license. Neither the Legislature nor the Division of 
Medical Quality has articulated standards to guide the DECs' 
exercise of discretion as to the terms of any Diversion Pro­
gram contract. The DECs' decisionmaking is not reviewed or 
ratified by any member of the Medical Board or its staff. 
Thus, Business and Professions Code subsections 2352(e) 
and (f), as interpreted by the Diversion Program, are uncon­
stitutional. They improperly delegate state police power to 
private parties, and fail to establish standards to guide the 
exercise of that power. The statutes should be repealed; state 
police power decisionmaking should be reserved to duly ap­
pointed Medical Board members and its employed profes­
sional staff. 
• Antitrust Concerns. Generally, state and federal anti­
trust laws preclude combinations in restraint of trade (such 
as collusion or agreement by entrepreneurs to exclude others 
in competition).63 An agreement by entrepreneurs to exclude 
those in competition (which may be accomplished by enforc­
ing a barrier to entry into a profession or by excision from the 
profession through the enforcement process) is termed a 
"group boycott" or "concerted refusal to deal." Such behav­
ior, where horizontal in nature, is often considered to be a per 
se violation of federal antitrust law.64 
Where carried out by combinations of competitors ap­
pointed to state occupational licensing boards, such 
anticompetitive activities are permitted only if they meet the 
"state action" test.65 To qualify for so-called "state action im­
munity" from the application of federal antitrust law, chal­
lenged activities must meet both prongs of a two-pronged 
test: ( l )  the restraint of trade must be clearly articulated in 
state law with the purpose to displace competition; and (2) 
the restraint must be subject to "active state supervision" by 
independent officials.66 
The restraint of trade at issue here is the participation of 
the members of the DECs (private parties, three-fifths of 
whom are physicians) in one of the primary police power 
functions of the Diversion Program-unilateral decision­
making as to the tenns of a Diversion Program participant's 
contract and the exercise of his/her professional license. Even 
assuming this activity meets the first prong of the two-part 
test described above (in that it is "clearly articulated" in Busi­
ness and Professions Code subsections 2352(e) and (f)),67 the 
major issue relates to the second prong of the "state action" 
immunity test: the requirement of active and independent state 
supervision. Again, this concept rests with the basic notion 
of unlawful delegation (see above). Even if it wants to do so, 
"the state" (here, the Legislature and the Medical Board) may 
not delegate to private interests the role of guardian over a 
restraint of trade which benefits them. In the leading case of 
Midcal,68 the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated a California 
law allowing liquor distillers to set resale prices and submit 
them to a state agency (the Department of Alcoholic Bever­
age Control) for approval. The Court voided the law because 
the agency, which was required to review the proposed prices 
on behalf of the general public, routinely rubberstamped the 
prices submitted by the distillers without exercising bona fide 
independent supervision. 
Here, "the state" (the Legislature) has apparently autho­
rized the DECs to exercise state police power in subsections 
2352(e) and (f). However, "the state's" job is not finished. 
Under Midcal, "the state" (the Medical Board) must also ex­
ercise "active supervision" over the activities, recommenda­
tions, and decisions of the DEC. As noted above, no one at 
the Medical Board reviews or ratifies DEC decisionmaking 
regarding the terms of Diversion Program contracts. Nor, 
under Midcal, may such supervision be perfunctory. It must 
be actual and active supervision, with control and actual 
decisionmaking vested in public officials accountable to the 
body politic from which the exercised power derives. Clearly, 
the second prong of the Midcal test is not met, and the Medi­
cal Board is exposing itself to significant antitrust liability. 
The Secrecy Which Shrouds the 
Diversion Program 
The Diversion Program operates in absolute confidenti­
ality. The Program and its supporters argue that such confi­
dentiality is absolutely essential in order to attract impaired 
physicians into the Program. However, that intended result 
has not come to pass-only 200-240 physicians have ever 
been enrolled in the Program at any given time since 1980.69 
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Consumers should be able to learn whether their physi- should have had a participation rate of at least 2,000 physi-
cian is abusing or addicted to drugs or alcohol, but no such cians . The Program-with its "graduation" of only 623 phy-
information is forthcoming from the Medical Board. And- sicians since 1980, and the unknown whereabouts of289 par-
as mentioned above, the Program ticipants who have "unsuccess------ ·-- --·-·· -- - - - -·- -- ---- ---·· ··-· --- -maintains confidentiality of phy- fully terminated" from the pro-
sician participation not only from Consumers should be able to learn gram since 198072-is not even 
the public, but from the Board's whether their physician is abusing or touching the tip of this very dan-
own Enforcement Program. This addicted to drugs or alcohol, but no such gerous iceberg. At best, the Pro-
is particularly troublesome when information is forthcoming from the . gram can be said to have ad-
the Diversion Program requires a . _ __ -"°'�!i�al Boar�:____ i dressed 10--15% of the problem. participant to agree not to prac- When questioned by DMQ 
tice medicine, but does not communicate such agreement to members about the Program's low participation level, Diver-
the Enforcement Program. If Enforcement thereafter receives sion Program staff frequently note that participation is a "hard 
a complaint or report about such a physician which indicates sell" because of the Program's structural location within the 
that the physician is in fact practicing medicine, it will not Medical Board; according to staff, physicians perceive that the 
detect this violation of the agree- in-house Diversion Program may 
ment. Nor will the Diversion Pro- - · ·- ---- · --- - -·· ·-· · be too closely connected to the 
gram, because it has no monitor- At best, the Program can be said to have Board's Enforcement Program.73 
ing mechanism to detect whether addressed I O- IS% of the problem. Nor has the Program de vel-
a physician who has agreed to ------ · ··-· · - ··--- ----· · ··· ·· · ·- · · -·· --· oped mechanisms to detect 
cease practice has in fact resumed practice. chemical dependence or symptoms thereof. While other states' 
If the Diversion Program had a sterling record of effec- licensure renewal forms require the self-disclosure of, for ex-
tiveness and accountability, some level of secrecy might be ample, recent charges or convictions of drug- or alcohol-re-
tolerated. However, as noted above, three separate state au- lated offenses, MBC's license renewal form does not seek 
dits of the Program during the 1980s all found that the moni- that information. 
toring provided by the Program is deficient,70 and no aspect 
of the Program has been meaningfully changed since then. 
Because there is confidentiality, there must be accountabil­
ity. However, instead of confidentiality and accountability, 
the Medical Board's Diversion Program suffers from no ac­
countability and consumers suffer from its confidentiality. 
Operational Deficiencies within the 
Diversion Program 
No Required or Presumed Practice Cessation 
Unlike the Board of Registered Nursing74 and medical 
boards in other states,75 MBC's Diversion Program does not 
require a temporary cessation of medical practice during the 
extensive evaluation necessary to determine the extent of 
chemical dependency, inpatient or outpatient treatment, or the 
early and fragile stages of recovery. 
After contacting MBC's Diversion Program, a prospec­
tive participant is interviewed within two to three days by a Other flaws plague the Medical Board's Diversion Pro- group facilitator or case manager. Group meeting attendance gram, due largely to the absence of _ _  -··· ··· . .. .. _ .. _ .. . . . -· · __ . .  _ .. _ . ____ _ begins fairly quickly. Consul-strong Program oversight by the Di- MBC' 0. • p d tation among group facilita-s 1vers1on rogram oes not vision of Medical Quality. These de- • • f �-''cal tors, case managers, and medi-requtrf a temporary cessation o m-.1 ficiencies are briefly catalogued be- • • cal consultants at the Medical practice during the extensive evaluation low. ' necessary to determine the extent of Board's diSlrict (regional) of-
MBC Has Few Mechanisms to 
Detect Chemical Dependence 
chemical dependency; inpatient or fices begins to flow, and a 
outpatient treatment, or the early and group consensus develops as 
As described above, the Diver- fragile,stages of recovery. to what kind of physical, psy--~- ·- __ ··-·- _ _ _ __ -· ~•~ ____ chiatric, psychological, neuro-sion Program offers several "carrots" ·----------- �---�- �-�- -------------- . ---
to entice drug- and alcohol-dependent physicians into par­
ticipation-including immunity from disciplinary action for 
self-abuse of drugs or alcohol, and confidential participation 
(neither the Board's Enforcement Program nor inquiring con­
sumers will be told of the participation of physicians who 
self-refer into the program). However, neither of these mecha­
nisms has succeeded in luring more than 200--240 physicians 
into the Program at any given time in its 19-year history. 
Statistically, at least 3,500--4,000 physicians actually experi­
enced drug or alcohol addiction during that period.71 To have 
meaningfully addressed this problem, the Diversion Program 
logical, competency, or other 
evaluations the participant should undergo during the next 
several weeks. Within the next several months, the partici­
pant appears before the Diversion Evaluation Committee, 
which fashions the individualized agreement and gives the 
participant five days in which to sign it. During this entire 
time period, however, the participant is usually free to prac­
tice medicine (including writing prescriptions); his/her license 
remains unrestricted and unfettered. The only assured moni­
toring of that physician is achieved via a group facilitator 
who conducts twice-weekly group meetings, and twice­
monthly urine tests. The Program lacks a requirement or even 
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a presumption that participants will be asked to immediately cease practice during assessment, treatment, and the early stages of recovery; further, it lacks standards upon which such a decision should be made by any of the various Diversion Program "players."76 
Frequency of Required Urine Testing Prior to May 1998, Program policy required participants' urine to be tested only twice per month-and one of those tests occurred at a regularly-scheduled group meeting which could easily be anticipated by the 
the Program lacks a meaningful enforcement mechanism to detect whether physicians who are dangerous, have been asked not to practice, and have agreed not to practice have in fact resumed practice (including the prescription of drugs for him/ herself or others). This is particularly troublesome. Theoreti­cally, the Diversion Program has identified a very dangerous physician-one who is probably using drugs or alcohol and is a threat to patients-and has secured his/her agreement not to practice. But nothing and no one in the Diversion Program can detect whether that physician is in fact practicing.77 And, as noted above, if the Board's En­participant. A random urine test was required to be conducted only once per month. In response to CPIL criticism of this practice, the Diversion Program abruptly (and without discussion, review, or 
The Diversion Program has no monitoring 
mechanism to ensure that a physician who 
has· agreed not to practice medicine has in 
forcement Program receives a complaint about that physician which indicates that the physician is practicing medicine, it will 
fact ceased practice. 
------- -- . -----
ratification by the Division of Medical Quality) changed its policy to require two random tests per month. This policy-even the changed policy-is insufficient to provide adequate public protection from physicians who are permitted to practice medicine and are at risk of relapse. Physicians who are admitted alcoholics or addicts, who are at the early stages of recovery, and who are permitted to con­
tinue practicing medicine should be random-tested several times per week to ensure that they have not relapsed. 
The DECs"'Monitoring" of Diversion Program 
Participants The DECs are not structured or resourced to provide ad­equate monitoring of Diversion Program participants. As noted above, DEC members are volunteers with other jobs and live­lihoods. The DECs meet only once every three months, and must determine (a) whether a physician should be formally admitted into the Diversion Program, and (b) whether the phy­sician should be permitted to prac-
tice medicine, and under what con- · ·· - · ·-•-. · ---
__ _____ _ , never know that the complained-of physician is a Diversion Pro­gram participant who has agreed not to practice. For the most dangerous physicians who have been asked not to practice, the Diversion Program has no meaningful detection mecha­nism to ensure compliance. 
The Program Lacks a Policy for Handling Relapse DMQ has adopted very few regulations to implement the Diversion Program's enabling act.78 Of particular concern, it has failed to codify any policy whatsoever on its approach toward relapse (also called, in rehabilitation parlance, a "slip" or "remission interruption"). Because of this failure, DECs lack standards to guide decisionmaking on whether to termi­nate a participant from the program for failure to comply with the contract. Many physicians who finally enroll in the Board's Di­version Program have "flunked out" of other rehabilitation programs, and do so only because they know that their prac­tice is at risk, that their drug/alcohol abuse will eventually be detected by patients, colleagues, 
ditions, on the basis of one meet­ing with the participant. Of signifi­cance, the DECs may not initially meet with the participant ( or ap-
The approach of DMQ and its Diversion 
Program should not be a "touchy-feely" 
coddling of addicts, because these are not 
ordinary addicts. 
or co-workers, and that they will become the subject of complaints to the Medical Board. Participa­tion in the Diversion Program should be the physician's last chance-not the first chance in plicant for participation) for sev- - - ------ ---------------- --- -- ------eral months after the initial application; prior to this meeting, it is unclear exactly who is meeting face-to-face with the ap­plicant, who is deciding whether the physician is capable of safe practice during rehabilitation, and whether that person is qualified to make that determination. Further, after the initial meeting, the DECs do not routinely meet with participants. All further "monitoring" is performed by group facilitators, with occasional observation by the case managers. 
Program Monitoring of Participants Who Have 
Agreed Not to Practice The Diversion Program has no monitoring mechanism to ensure that a physician who has agreed not to practice medi­cine has in fact ceased practice. The DEC may ask a danger­ous physician to voluntarily refrain from practice. However, 
which violations of the contract terms are repeatedly toler­ated. The approach of DMQ and its Diversion Program should not be a "touchy-feely" coddling of addicts, because these are not ordinary addicts. These addicts are physicians-phy­sicians who retain a full and unrestricted license to practice medicine in California, a full and unrestricted license to cause irreparable harm to the people of California. Nevertheless, Diversion Program documents contain repeated references to uncomfortably lax policies which apparently permit re­peated relapse without penalty: • "Problem cases that cannot be resolved with the case con­sultant are brought to the attention of the DEC for changes in the physician's Diversion Agreement."79 • "The case managers regularly review their cases to identify any which may have compliance issues. If any 
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participant is found to be out of compliance, the case 
manager will examine the physician's recovery program 
and work closely with the group facilitator to discover 
what is going on. When problems arise, necessary action 
is taken promptly."80 
• "The case managers have incorporated several pro­
cedures to improve the documentation of cases. Notes 
are prepared at the bottom of each positive urine test 
that indicates the action taken and whom they con­
tacted to assist them in deciding the action. They are now 
preparing a written report of all unusual incidents related 
to a case."81 
• "Each Diversion [Evaluation] Committee meets four 
times a year. The meetings are held to assess physicians 
for entry into the Program, determine if a participant 
F E AT U RE ARTI CLE 
use of 12-step programs" in the required group sessions.84 If 
the purpose of the program is therapeutic, the persons pro­
viding such therapy should be licensed by the state in a rel­
evant field (e.g., licensed as a psychiatrist, psychologist, li­
censed clinical social worker, marriage/family/child counse­
lor, or certified as a drug and alcohol abuse counselor). How­
ever, not all of the group facilitators "employed" as indepen­
dent contractors by the Diversion Program are licensed thera­
pists; nor is it clear whether the Diversion Program even re­
quires licensure of its group facilitators. Simply put, if the 
purpose of the Program is therapy, the Medical Board is au­
thorizing the unlicensed practice of therapy. In failing to clarify 
the primary role of the Diversion Program, and in permitting 
unlicensed persons to engage in therapy, DMQ is exposing 
patients to severe risk and the state to significant liability. 85 
is ready to graduate from the Program, and to deal Method of Payment to Group Facilitators 
with participants who are not in compliance with their Group facilitators are not MBC employees, but indepen-
Diversion Agreement."32 dent contractors to the Diversion Program. They are paid di-
The Diversion Program's toleration of repeated viola- rectly by Diversion Program participants, at a rate of $235 
tions of contract terms is a clear violation of Business and per month for twice-weekly group meetings, or $165 per 
Profession Code section 2229, 
�-------�-- _______ 
month for once-weekly group 
which states that protection of the , 
1 
meetings. Depending on the num-
public is the highest priority for Consumers sh�uld not be requi.-ed t<> ber of participants for any indi-
the DMQ in exercising its disci- tolerate drug/alcohol abuse by their vidual group facilitator, the 
plinary authority : "In exercising physicians, and they surely should not be facilitator's income for conduct-
[its] disciplinary authority, . . .  the required to tolerate recidivism after • ing two 1 .5-hour meetings per 
division . . .  shall, wherever possible, second chance. If the Diversion Program week could be quite hefty. A 1993 
take action that is calculated to aid does, it_�-!��� be abolishe�_: __ _ __ . _ ____ ____ . investigative report found that 
in the rehabili tation of the one of the Program's group facili-
licensee . . . .  Where rehabilitation and protection are inconsis- tators was making over $7,000 per month for conducting two 
tent, protection shall be paramount." In admitting a licensee group meetings per week.86 It is arguable that this method of 
into the Diversion Program and refraining from disciplining direct payment could cloud the facilitator's objectivity, be-
that licensee, the Board is "taking action that is calculated to cause reporting a participant's noncompliance with the terms 
aid in the rehabilitation of the licensee." But in tolerating re- of his/her contract to the DEC or the Diversion Program Man-
peated violations of the contract, the Diversion Program is ager might lead to termination of a paycheck. CPIL has long 
violating the last sentence of sec- urged the Diversion Program to 








change the method of payment to 
s- h f .1 d d th .. owever • . · rogram oes no mon r t f . 1 . F 1 1orts ave ru e , an e para- tr·--t. •• ad t du . . i . , group ac1 Itators. or examp e, ,, . . f bl" or ll'l. gr ua � -part1c1pants n any , . . Id . h k mount pnonty o pu 1c protec- its 69%., te" fi i _ · partlc1pants cou wnte a c ec tion is violated if the Program fails �� ith tsu�ceisfis ra 
c,ure 5 a to the Diversion Program and the 
h . 
. 
E s_...»wC: w ou stgn cance« ; , 
.. Pr Id f T to report t e participant to n- ___ --- ___ _ :_ _ -- __ _ __ _ __ _ ___ - _ __ _ _ __ _ __ _ _  , ogram cou pay ac1 1tators a 
forcement after recidivism. Con- flat rate based on a range number 
sumers should not be required to tolerate drug/alcohol abuse of participants, to eliminate this potential conflict of interest. 
by their physicians, and they surely should not be required to However, the Diversion Program has declined to change the 
tolerate recidivism after a second chance. If the Diversion payment method for group facilitators. 
Program does, it should be abolished. 
Unlicensed Practice ofTherapy 
Neither the Legislature nor the Medical Board has ever 
clarified whether the primary purpose of the Diversion Pro­
gram is monitoring or therapy.83 This is a significant distinc­
tion-especially in terms of the qualifications of persons hired 
to administer the program. Diversion Program documents cir­
culated in 1993 indicated that the group facilitators who con­
duct group meetings on the local level are expected to pro­
vide "recovery-oriented psychotherapy which focuses on the 
The Program's ••success Rate" 
The Medical Board constantly advertises a 69% (or there­
abouts) "success rate" for participants of the Diversion Pro­
gram. This means that 69% of the physicians who are admit­
ted to the Program actually complete it by attending group 
meetings for three years87 and demonstrating sobriety and a 
commitment to a sober lifestyle. 
However, the Program does not monitor or track "gra­
duated" participants in any way, so its 69% "success rate" 
figure is a statistic without significance. At a 1998 national 
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conference on health professional diversion programs, 88 Dr. 
Richard Fuller from the National Institute of Alcohol Abuse 
and Alcoholism admonished some programs for "lying with 
statistics" about their "success rates," and revealed the ways 
in which health care boards misleadingly calculate their "suc­
cess rates": (1) they track and report only on graduates who 
have a good prognosis (e.g. , a stable family environment, em­
ployment, an intact social structure) and who are likely to 
stick with their commitment to so-
many are motivated to join the Program because of pending 
(or perceived possible) disciplinary charges; (2) many are able 
to practice medicine during rehabilitation-such that they can 
afford the cost of private monitoring programs; and (3) there is 
little assured tracking of either those participating in the Pro­
gram or those who drop out of the Program. 
CPIL is torn between recommending wholesale 
privatization of the rehabilitation process or retention of the 
Diversion Program within the 
briety; (2) they report only on 
"easily located" graduates; this 
inflates the "success rate" because 
those who are easily located are 
generally doing better than those 
who are difficult to locate; (3) 
they keep the follow-up period as 
short as possible, e.g. , three 
months or shorter; (4) they avoid 
control or comparison groups; (5) 
CPIL is torn between recommending 
wholesale privatization of the rehabi­
litatio n  pro cess o r  retenti o n  o f  the 
Diversion Program within the M edical 
Board with significant enhancements to 
protect the pu�lic. In CPIL's view, the 
existing Diversi_o_n Program is the worst of 
both worlds. 
Medical Board with significant 
enhancements to protect the pub­
lic. In CPIL's view, the existing 
Diversion Program is the worst of 
both worlds. It is a private reha­
bilitation program functioning 
within a public agency-a public 
agency which grants immunity 
they use a liberal definition of "success"; and (6) they rely 
solely on self-reporting by the graduate; they don't require 
drug tests or talk to workplace monitors or others in a posi­
tion to be candid. Dr. Fuller stated that a credible "success 
rate" would be based on a yearlong (at least) follow-up of all 
program graduates (not just the easily located ones) which is 
not based solely on self-reporting and includes random drugs 
tests and interviews with workplace monitors and others who 
come in contact with former diversion program participants. 
The Medical Board's Diversion Program doesn't bother 
with any postgraduate monitoring whatsoever. It simply 
claims a 69% "success rate" based on completion of a basic 
program which involves very little monitoring and only two 
random urine tests per month. Such a claim is meaningless. 
Suggestions and Solutions 
Preliminarily, CPIL is not convinced the State of Califor­
nia should be involved in the personal rehabilitation of a phy­
sician, a lawyer, or any other regulated licensee. Rehabilita­
tion is primarily a private sector function. Many private sector 
organizations offer drug rehabilitation programs, including pro­
grams specifically tailored for 
from prosecution for certain of­
fenses and which engages in in­
adequate monitoring both for resumed drug/alcohol use and 
for resumed practice where such practice has been curtailed­
all of which is cross-subsidized with public money. 
Obviously, the Legislature could repeal the statutes cre­
ating the Diversion Program and get the Medical Board out 
of the business of personal rehabilitation. If it chooses to re­
tain the program within the Medical Board, the Legislature 
should strengthen the Diversion Program statutes as follows: 
• New laws should require Diversion Program partici­
pants to agree, as a condition of admission into the Pro­
gram, to cease the practice of medicine at least during 
required multidisciplinary physical and mental evalua­
tions, any necessary inpatient or outpatient drug/ 
alcohol treatment, and the early stages of recovery. The 
new laws should also require participants to agree to 
be referred to the Enforcement Program should they 
breach any term or condition of their Diversion Pro­
gram contract. 
• New laws should require DMQ to take immediate action to 
adopt regulations to guide the administration of the Diver­
sion Program, especially in the following areas: (1) the de­
professionals. There is no rea­
son for state licensing boards 
to duplicate what the private 
sector is adequately providing. 
If a state licensee has problems 
with drugs or alcohol which af­
fect his/her competence and 
thereby threaten the safety of 
his/her patients or clients, it 
DMQ should be required to adopt  
protocols,  procedures, and  reporting 
requirements about the decisionmaking of 
the Diversion Program which staff must 
follow, and to develop intrusive monitoring 
mechanisms t o  enable the Division to 
ensure that staff is in fact following them. 
velopment of substantive criteria 
governing a physician's readiness to 
return to medical practice; (2) a com­
prehensive policy on the Program's 
response to relapse;89 (3) the devel­
opment of substantive criteria for 
conduct which warrants termination 
from the Program; and (4) the fre­
quency of required urine testing. L _____ ---·- ·-·- --·- . - ----- �- . -· 
seems that the state s role is to take the license until the lic­
ensee proves him/herself capable of practicing safely. The lic­
ensee is free to avail him/herself of any number of private re­
habilitation services, and resume practice if and when he/she 
proves to the state that he/she is sober and capable of safe prac­
tice. It is unclear why the state, at public expense, must bear 
the cost of the licensee's rehabilitation-particularly when (1) 
• DMQ should be required to adopt protocols, procedures, 
and reporting requirements about the decisionmaking of 
the Diversion Program which staff must follow, and to 
develop intrusive monitoring mechanisms to enable the 
Division to ensure that staff is in fact following them.90 
The Legislature should require DMQ to create a Standing 
Committee on the Diversion Program within DMQ, and 
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charge it with continuous and comprehensive monitoring 
of the Diversion Program. 
• The Legislature should repeal or substantially amend the 
statutes creating DECs to clarify that DECs are advisory 
bodies which have no authority to exercise state police 
power. Diversion Program staff, directly accountable to 
the Medical Board's Executive Director and to DMQ for 
implementing DMQ-adopted policies and protocols, 
should make all decisions about the terms and conditions 
of a participant's contract and continued participation in 
the Diversion Program. 
• The Legislature should require the Program to monitor 
physicians who have agreed not to practice, to ensure 
that-in fact-they do not practice (including the prescrib­
ing of drugs). New laws should require that the identity of 
physicians who have agreed not to practice be communi­
cated to MBC's Enforcement Program to ensure that vio­
lations of that agreement can be detected via consumer 
complaints or reports by employers . 
• The Legislature should require the Medical Board to re­
vise its license renewal form to require renewal applicants 
to disclose, under penalty of perjury, whether they have 
been charged with or convicted of offenses involving drugs 
or alcohol during the prior renewal period; and to develop 
other methods of obtaining information about drug- and 
alcohol-related problems or misconduct by licensees. 
• The Legislature should reiterate that all Diversion Pro­
gram group facilitators providing therapy must be licensed 
therapists or certified drug and alcohol abuse counselors. 
• New laws should specify that group facilitators be paid a 
flat rate for conducting group meetings for Diversion Pro­
gram participants; and should require Diversion Program 
participants-to the extent possible, and especially when 
they are permitted to practice medicine-to pay a much 
greater share of the overhead costs of the Program than 
they currently do. 
• The Legislature should require the Diversion Program to 
track all "graduates" for at least one year after release from 
the Program, to determine the effectiveness of the Pro­
gram in helping physicians to maintain sobriety. This post­
graduate tracking should include self-reporting; interviews 
with family members, workplace monitors, and others who 
come in contact with former Diversion Program partici­
pants; and random drugs tests. The Program should also 
track former participants who have "terminated unsuccess­
fully" from the Program. These data should be examined 
annually by DMQ and the Legislature, and should be the 
basis for future decisionmaking about the fate of the Di­
version Program. 
• Finally, the Legislature should instruct the Bureau of State 
Audits (formerly the Office of the Auditor General) to take 
another independent look at the actual practices of the Di­
version Program, to determine whether the Program has 
rectified the very serious problems first identified in 1 982. 
F EATURE ARTI CLE 
Conclusion 
Despite the number and severity of the problems de­
scribed above, the Diversion Program continues to exist .  Fur­
ther, it has recently been given jurisdiction over other types 
of problem cases, and pending legislation would give it even 
more responsibility-without any significant change in its 
structure or operations. 
Since January 1 ,  1997, Business and Professions Code 
section 821 .5 has established a new reporting route for hos­
pital peer review bodies that are investigating physicians 
whom they believe to be suffering from "a disabling mental 
or physical condition that poses a threat to patient care." In­
stead of referring these reports to the Medical Board's En­
forcement Program under Business and Professions Code 
section 805, new section 821.5 requires peer review bodies 
to report these cases to the Diversion Program, and the Pro­
gram Manager must periodically contact the peer review body 
to monitor the progress of the investigation.91 Between Janu­
ary 1 997 and June 1 998, 26 such investigations were reported 
to the Diversion Program.92 
And at this writing, Senate Bill 1 045 (Murray)-spon­
sored by the California Medical Association-would amend 
Business and Professions Code section 805, which currently 
requires hospital peer review bodies to report a physician's 
resignation or leave of absence "following notice of an im-
. pending investigation" to the Medical Board's Enforcement 
Program; such leaves are often taken to enable the physician 
to enter inpatient drug/alcohol treatment. SB I 045 would con­
vert such reports from section 805 reports to the Enforce­
ment Program into section 821 .5 reports to the Diversion Pro­
gram if a physician takes a leave of absence in order to enter 
into a drug/alcohol treatment program. Under SB 1 045, the 
Diversion Program manager-upon receiving such a report­
is required to "review any ongoing monitoring program ... [to] 
ensure that it is adequate to protect the public, that it includes 
the requirement that all other hospitals where the physician 
has privileges are notified of the agreement, and that any vio­
lation of the monitoring requirements are reported to the di­
version program administrator. At the discretion of the diver­
sion program administrator; a physician ... who repeatedly vio­
lates a monitoring agreement may be required to participate 
in the diversion program of the Medical Board of Califor­
nia."93 In other words, the Medical Board's Enforcement Pro­
gram is deprived of all information about a potentially dan­
gerous drug- or alcohol-abusing physician, and that physi­
cian may be given many more "bites of the apple" than he/ 
she is currently entitled to receive. 
The Diversion Program is significantly flawed. Because 
of the secrecy which shrouds the Program, the utter lack of 
any substantive standards which guide Program decision­
making, the Program's own failure to comply with state law 
requiring comprehensive reporting about its decisions and its 
cost, and the Division of Medical Quality's wholesale failure 
to properly oversee the Program, it is impossible for anyone 
to determine whether Diversion Program protects the public 
from the state's most dangerous physicians.94 Yet that is 
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exactly what the Legislature has demanded of the Medical 
Board in Business and Professions Code sections 2229 and 
2340. The Legislature should not consider any bill referring 
more cases to the Program without restructuring the Program 
and requiring the Division of Medical Quality to take proper 
and accountable ownership of it. The Medical Board 's Di­
version Task Force is midway through a comprehensive re­
view of the Program, and should be permitted to complete its 
work and make its recommendations without having to con­
tend with new changes to the Program. The question for the 
Legislature is whether to retain the Program within the Medi­
cal Board and, if so, how to restructure it; not whether to add 
new responsibilities to the ones it has proven it cannot handle. 
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